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Abstract
Intuitively, a pluralist solution is one in which a single question re-
ceives multiple answers. Such pluralist solutions have been proposed in
many widely disparate contexts. This paper restates the concept of plu-
ralism with greater precision; distinguishes it from, and establishes its
independence of, some other notions with which it is frequently confused;
and briefly lays out some of the benefits that this more nuanced approach
to pluralism may yield for the debates in which it may be invoked.
Let Q be a set of questions:
Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn}
Let A be a set of answers:
A = {A1, A2, . . . , Am}
Let a position, P , be a function with domain Q and codomain A. If P is defined
over Q then every question has a unique answer. Where P (Qi) = Aj we will
write QiAj , read as “Aj answers Qi”. Thus we may write
P = {Q1P (Q1), Q2P (Q2), . . . , QnP (Qn)}
Let P be a set of admissible positions, that is definitions of P . Hence
P = {{Q1P1(Q1), Q2P1(Q2), . . . , QnP1(Qn)},
{Q1P2(Q1), Q2P2(Q2), . . . , QnP2(Qn)},
...
{Q1Pk(Q1), Q2Pk(Q2), . . . , QnPk(Qn)}}
where 1 ≤ k ≤ nm. The elements of P may be simply ordered in an intuitive
fashion.1 If a pair of questions, Qi, Qj, receives the same answer in every element
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1Each element may be given the unique index 1+
∑n
i=1
mn−i(ji−1), where P (Qi) = Aji .
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of P we may replace them in Q with their conjunction, Qi ∧ Qj, without loss
of generality.2 We shall see that different constraints on the membership of P
yield different conceptions of pluralism.
An asymmetry in this model is that multiple questions can receive the same
answer, but multiple answers cannot hold for the same question (in the same
position). This is a consequence of the requirement that P be a function. This
restriction may be removed by making P a set-valued function, or multifunction,
ranging over the power set of A. We might then distinguish positions in which
multiple answers are assigned to single questions as those satisfying the condition
(S) (∃x)(∃y)(|Px(Qy)| > 1)
However, this is not pluralism: in pluralist situations a question may receive any
of a range of answers individually; here a question would receive all of a range of
answers jointly. We shall rather call situations meeting (S) syncretist. In what
follows, this possibility will be ignored, and P will be assumed to be a function.
However, this constraint is not essential to any of the forthcoming definitions,
and it will always remain possible to substitute the multifunction definition of
P , permitting the presentation of syncretist variants of all the positions set out
below.
The simplest cases arise when either Q or A is a singleton. If A is the
singleton set {A} then
P = {{Q1A,Q2A, . . . , QnA}}
Since P has only one element, it is trivial that each Qi always has the same
answer and thus that
P ∼= {{(
n
∧
i=1
Qi)A}}
Hence the case with singleton A is a special case of that with both A and Q
singletons, P = {{QA}}. We shall say that this situation is global, since in
every position every question receives the same answer, and that it is monist,
since every question receives the same answer in every position. More formally,
we may say that P satisfies the conditions
(G) (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(Px(Qy) = Px(Qz))
(M) (∀y)(∀w)(∀x)(Pw(Qy) = Px(Qy))
We shall call any situation in which (G) and (M) hold global monism. If Q is a
singleton, {Q}, but A has more than one member then
P = {{QA1}, {QA2}, . . . , {QAm}}
2Alternatively, we may borrow from erotetic logic the convention that a question is defined
by the answers it may receive, making Qi, Qj and Qi ∧ Qj equivalent if Qi and Qj receive
the same answer in every position.
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This situation is still global, but it is also pluralist, since the same question
receives different answers in different positions. That is P satisfies the conditions
(G) (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(Px(Qy) = Px(Qz))
(∼M) (∃y)(∃w)(∃x)(Pw(Qy) 6= Px(Qy))
We shall call any situation meeting these conditions global pluralism.
Now consider situations in which neither A nor Q are singletons. If P
is nevertheless constrained to a single element in which at least some of the
questions receive different answers, say
P = {Q1Aj1 , Q2Aj2 , . . . , QnAjn}
where 1 ≤ ji ≤ m, a new sort of situation will arise. This situation, local
monism, satisfies the conditions
(∼G) (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Px(Qy) 6= Px(Qz))
(M) (∀y)(∀w)(∀x)(Pw(Qy) = Px(Qy))
(Where m ≥ n every question may receive a different answer; otherwise, two
or more questions may be conjoined as described above.) However, in many
situations, including the maximal case where P includes every possible position
P , there will be at least one question which does not receive the same answer in
every position, and at least one position will assign different answers to different
questions. That is to say, the conditions
(∼G) (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Px(Qy) 6= Px(Qz))
(∼M) (∃y)(∃w)(∃x)(Pw(Qy) 6= Px(Qy))
will be satisfied. Call any situation meeting these conditions local pluralism. It is
now a simple exercise to demonstrate that every possible value of P corresponds
to one of these four situations.
However, two additional constraints may be arrived at by weakening the
conditions (G) and (M):
(G′) (∃x)(∀y)(∀z)(Px(Qy) = Px(Qz))
(M′) (∃y)(∀w)(∀x)(Pw(Qy) = Px(Qy))
Weak globalism (G′) states that there are some positions in which every question
receives the same answer and weak monism (M′) states that there are some
questions which receive the same answer in every position. Conversely, the
negations of (G′) and (M′) represent strengthenings of (∼G) and (∼M):
(∼G′) (∀x)(∃y)(∃z)(Px(Qy) 6= Px(Qz))
(∼M′) (∀y)(∃w)(∃x)(Pw(Qy) 6= Px(Qy))
Strong localism (∼G′) states that every position contains questions which receive
different answers; strong pluralism (∼M′) states that no question receives the
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same answer in every position. Since the sets A and Q are non-empty, it can be
easily verified that (G) ⇒ (G′), (M) ⇒ (M′), (∼G) ∧ (M) ⇒ (∼G′) and (G) ∧
(∼M) ⇒ (∼M′). Hence, these additional constraints only have an effect when
both (∼G) and (∼M) apply, that is in cases of local pluralism. Constraints on P
such that at least one question, but not every question, receives the same answer
in every position meet the conditions (∼G), (∼M) and (M′). We will call this
situation hybrid pluralism. Conversely, the conditions (∼G), (∼M) and (G′) are
satisfied when at least one, but not every, position assigns the same answer to
every question. We will call this situation hybrid localism. (Note that some
situations will exhibit both hybrid forms.) Finally, we may refer to situations
in which (∼G), (∼M), (∼G′) and (∼M′) all apply as strict local pluralism.
The foregoing may be made clearer by a simple example. LetQ = {Q1, Q2, Q3}
and A = {A1, A2}. Then, maximally,
P = {{Q1A1, Q2A1, Q3A1}, (P1)
{Q1A1, Q2A1, Q3A2}, (P2)
{Q1A1, Q2A2, Q3A1}, (P3)
{Q1A1, Q2A2, Q3A2}, (P4)
{Q1A2, Q2A1, Q3A1}, (P5)
{Q1A2, Q2A1, Q3A2}, (P6)
{Q1A2, Q2A2, Q3A1}, (P7)
{Q1A2, Q2A2, Q3A2}} (P8)
Restricting P to either {P1} or {P8} produces global monism. Including both
elements, that is P = {P1, P8}, produces global pluralism. Each of {P2} through
{P7} produces local monism. Any combination which includes at least one of
both P1 and P8, and P2 through P7 will be hybrid localist. Combinations of
elements, such as {P1, P2} or {P5, P6, P7, P8}, in which at least one question
always receives the same answer, represent hybrid pluralism. All other sets of
elements, including the unrestricted P , represent strict local pluralism.
It should now be obvious that the global/local distinction is not identical to
that between monism and pluralism. This point has been recognized in previ-
ous taxonomies of pluralism, such as that of Susan Haack (1978) and Michael
Resnik (1996). However, for Haack, localism and globalism are subdivisions
of pluralism, whereas we have seen that the two distinctions are independent.
This idiosyncrasy of Haack’s classification leads to her misleadingly describing
local monism as local pluralism (Haack 1978, p. 223). Neither she nor Resnik
(1996, p. 499), who adopts her definition, considers the position which I call
local pluralism.
Conventional presentations of pluralism offer a stark choice between (implic-
itly global) monism and (implicitly global) pluralism. Even the more sophisti-
cated Haack/Resnick taxonomy does little to alleviate this dichotomy, since its
other distinction is subordinated to that between monism and pluralism. Hence
many debates in which a pluralist approach is mooted may be characterized as
a slide from global monism to global pluralism. Global monism represents an
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ideal scenario, in which a consensus has been achieved on a common solution to
an all-encompassing problem. Unfortunately, this ideal is remote. This failure
of global monism then leads inevitably to a confrontation between two or more
broadly defined and frequently irreconcilable positions, that is global pluralism.
Local and hybrid pluralism represent attractive intermediate stages, at which
the slide towards global pluralism may be arrested. Local pluralism captures
the intuitive thought that many large debates subsume smaller debates. Hybrid
pluralism adds that consensus may be found in some of the smaller debates, even
amongst proponents of sharply contrasted positions in the larger debate. In the
remainder of the paper I will discuss examples of this more nuanced approach.
Examples from recent ethical thought include Ronald Dworkin’s (1993) anal-
ysis of the abortion debate and Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) discussion of the
interaction of feminism and multiculturalism. Dworkin argues that if the abor-
tion debate is characterized crudely, for example as the question of whether the
foetus is a person, then the two sides will be irreconcilable. But, if the question
is broken down into smaller sub-questions, then an unexpected degree of con-
sensus may be found: most members of both lobbies agree that the lives of both
the mother and the foetus have value, and in some circumstances they agree
on whether abortion should be permissible. Nussbaum responds in a similar
way to the apparent conflict between feminism and the multiculturalist admo-
nition to respect non-Western cultures—despite their anti-feminist practices.
She breaks down the global pluralism of crude multiculturalism by challenging
the monolithic conception of ‘culture’. This permits a local pluralism, which
Nussbaum pushes towards hybrid pluralism by arguing for consensus over some
key intercultural questions. Whether or not one accepts Dworkin or Nussbaum’s
analyses, they both exhibit the utility of hybrid pluralism.
Another area in which pluralism has been especially conspicuous in recent
years is the philosophical discussion of the proliferation of non-classical log-
ics. Most recent accounts of logical pluralism, such as (Beall & Restall 2000),
are implicitly globalist: the pluralist offers multiple answers to the single ques-
tion “What is the true logic?”. However, most important non-classical systems
have a substantial common subsystem: classical logic itself. Intuitionists accept
the classical logicality of decidable propositions; paraconsistentists, consistent
propositions; quantum logicians, compatible propositions; and so forth. It has
even been suggested that this ‘recapture’ of classical logic is a necessary criterion
of logicality.3 In the light of these concessions, it is more plausible to charac-
terize logical pluralism as an instance of hybrid pluralism, with the proponents
of the different systems agreeing over the formalization of a central common
discourse, and diverging in other areas.
Even classical logic and its conservative extensions, that is the system(s) of
logic characteristically endorsed by logical monists, may be seen to exhibit a
degree of hybrid pluralism. Many classicists say that classical logic is the ‘one
true logic’. The natural understanding of this remark is global monism, with
3‘Perhaps . . . any genuine ‘logical system’ should contain classical logic as a special case’
(van Benthem 1994, p. 135).
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the unique answer understood as (first-order) classical logic. However, only a
minority of classicists would defend a restriction of logicality to first-order clas-
sical logic (Quine 1953; Hazen 1999). Most recognize a variety of quantified
or modal conservative extensions as equally logical. Taking this intuition seri-
ously, while retaining global monism, would require the single formal system to
somehow combine all the extensions of classical logic for which there might ever
be a need. Yet despite some na¨ıvely misplaced optimism, the construction of
such a compound system is a task of formidable technical difficulty if more than
a small range of familiar extensions are to be used (see, for example, Gabbay
1998). Furthermore, most conceivable applications would employ extensions
containing only some of the extra material rather than the unwieldy compound
system containing it all. So local monism would seem a closer approximation
to the actual commitments of the classical programme (cf. Haack 1974, p. 44).
However, it is widely acknowledged that many discourses addressed by conser-
vative extensions of classical logic, including alethic and other modalities, lack
an unambiguous choice of formalization. This suggests monism about the dis-
course of first-order classical logic, and some of its extensions, and pluralism
about that of some other extensions: that is to say, hybrid pluralism.
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